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I. INTRODUCTION
Repurchase agreements,2 more commonly known as "repos,"
have become a major concern in United States financial markets.3
2. The following hypothetical explains the mechanics of a repurchase agreement trans-
action. Assume that a savings and loan S wishes to attract short-term funds from the gen-
eral public P. S sells P an undivided interest in a security that S owns. S then transfers legal
title to the underlying securities to its correspondent bank to hold for the benefit of P. The
agreement between S and P sets forth the maturity date of the repurchase agreement. Al-
though repurchase agreements typically mature in less than 90 days, they always mature
before the maturity date of the underlying securities. Once the term of the agreement has
expired, S must repurchase P's interest in the underlying securities at an agreed upon price
that reflects P's initial "principal" payment plus a premium that corresponds to the prevail-
ing market rate of interest for other short-term obligations. S pays the repurchase price to P
from its general funds. An increase or decrease in the market value of the underlying securi-
ties does not affect the repurchase price S pays P. Consequently, P does not experience any
gain or loss stemming from changes in the market value of the underlying securities. See
Porter, Retail Repurchase Agreements Revisited, 99 BANKING L.J. 676, 679-80 (1982).
3. Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal publicly voiced this concern in a letter to the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Letter from Congressman Benjamin S. Rosen-
thal to Richard T. Prott, Chairman of the FHLBB, reprinted in Am. Banker, Aug. 13, 1981,
at 4, col. 1. In his letter, Congressman Rosenthal expressed concern that retail repo custom-
ers were not receiving adequate information about the risks of investing in retail repos. Id.
He specifically described four factors that increase the riskiness of repo investing. First,
when the market value of the securities underlying the repo transaction drops significantly,
the value of the securities may not be sufficient to back the entire repo obligation. Second, if
a savings and loan institution that issues repos fails, repo investors probably will become
only general creditors of the savings and loan because most investors hold only unperfected
security interests in the underlying securities. Third, some savings and loans back the repos
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One party to a repo agreement sells securities or an interest in se-
curities to another party and simultaneously agrees to repurchase
the same or similar securities at a later date for a somewhat higher
price.4 Although repos typically are short-term debt instruments,
investors now enjoy the option under federal law to renew them
automatically for an indefinite period of time.5 The premium that
the repurchasing party pays reflects the prevailing interest rate for
similar short-term debt instruments.' Government securities that
the United States Treasury or other federal agencies issue typically
back these transactions.'
Two types of repos-wholesale and retail-have evolved since
1949.8 Wholesale repos typically are large-denomination, short-
term contracts to sell and repurchase government securities., They
may serve one of two main purposes. First, the Federal Reserve
Board (Fed),10 operating through the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York," uses wholesale repos to carry out its monetary pol-
icy.12 The Fed temporarily injects money into the economy by
they issue, wholly or in part, with Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) securi-
ties despite the significant risks inherent in these securities. Last, if a savings and loan be-
comes insolvent, this could delay repo investors from liquidating the instruments. Id.
4. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
5. Amendment to Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.1(f)(2), 329.10(b)(2) (1983); see FED.
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,273 (Sept. 3, 1983).
6. RETAIl REPURCHASE AGREZMENTS-EXAwINATION GumLiNgs (Apr. 16, 1982) (letter
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 3 FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH) 1 35,303 [hereinafter cited as FED GUIDELINES].
7. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-18122
(1981)).
8. "The retail repo is relatively new ... The wholesale repo has been around much
longer." Holland, Repurchase Agreements Appearing Everywhere, 1 BNKING EXPANSION
REP. (LAW & BusINEss, INc.) 1, 1 (Oct. 4, 1982). Although the Federal Reserve Board (Fed)
began entering into wholesale repos with member banks in 1917, it later discontinued this
practice. The Fed recommenced issuing repos in June 1949 and has continued to participate
actively in the wholesale repo market since that time. See Geng, The Role of the Federal
Reserve in Repurchase Agreements, 290 PRAc. L. INsT. 29, 31-32 (1982).
9. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-18122).
10. The Fed affects United States monetary policy through its open market opera-
tions. See infra note 12.
11. Holland, supra note 8, at 10.
12. The Fed affects monetary policy whenever it buys or sells securities on the open
market. See 129 CONG. Rzc. H2523 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (statement of Rep. Glickman). If
the Fed wants to pursue an expansionary monetary policy, it may purchase securities on the
open market. These purchases decrease the supply of bonds and other outstanding securi-
ties in the market while increasing the supply of money in the economy. Conversely, if the
Fed pursues a contractionary monetary policy, it may sell securities in the open market.
These sales increase the supply of government securities in the market and decrease the
supply of money by an amount equal to the market value of the securities sold to the public.
Cf. id.
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purchasing the securities that underlie repurchase agreements with
government securities dealers.1 s The Fed also temporarily with-
draws money from the economy by selling securities to dealers
under reverse repos 14 to repurchase the same or similar securities
at a later time." Second, institutions such as government securities
dealers use wholesale repos to distribute or acquire short-term
funds."' Although government securities dealers have benefited sig-
nificantly because of their ability to obtain short-term funds in this
manner, the recent failures of two securities firms 17 that partici-
pated heavily in this second use of wholesale repos s have caused
investors in United States financial markets to question the safety
of wholesale repos19 and have demonstrated that repo investors
currently receive inadequate protection against these dangers.2
Retail repos differ from wholesale repos in several respects.
First, retail repos usually are obligations of depository institu-
tions," backed by either an interest in a security or a pool of secur-
ities.22 These securities either are direct obligations of the federal
government or at least are guaranteed by the federal government.2 3
Second, investors purchase retail repos in denominations up to a
13. Holland, supra note 8, at 10.
14. Repos and reverse repos merely are labels given to the two sides of a repo agree-
ment depending upon whether the perspective is that of the seller or buyer of the underly-
ing securities. The party that agrees to sell the securities and repurchase them at a later
date technically enters a repo. The party that agrees to buy the securities and resell them at
a later date technically enters a reverse repo. Id. at 8; see supra note 2.
15. Holland, supra note 8, at 10. If the Fed desires to inject funds into or withdraw
funds from the economy permanently, it typically buys or sells the securities outright with-
out entering a repurchase agreement. Id.
16. Government securities dealers often rely on repurchase agreement financing to
purchase newly issued government securities. 129 CONG. Rac. E3183 (daily ed. June 27,
1983) (statement of Rep. Fauntroy); 129 CONG. Rc. H2523 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (state-
ment of Rep. Glickman).
17. See infra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
18. Id; see Holland, supra note 8, at 10-11.
19. See, e.g., 47 Fed. Reg. 51,969 (1982) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-
19230) (the National Securities Clearing Corporation's discontinuation of investment in re-
pos); McCorry, Localities Seen Cutting Repo Activity, BOND BUYER, Dec. 15, 1982, at 4
(state and local governments have reduced repo investment by 29% since Lombard-Wal
filed for bankruptcy).
20. See infra notes 84-156 and accompanying text for an analysis of possible legal
characterizations of repurchase agreements that would give repurchase agreement investors
financial protection under the Bankruptcy Code and the securities laws.
21. Although not every repurchase agreement issuer is a depository institution, the
vast majority of issuers are banks or savings and loans. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (re-
printing SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-18122).
22. Id. at 48,637-38.
23. Id.
404
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maximum of $100,000, but they typically buy wholesale repos in
much larger denominations. 24 Last, parties to wholesale repos ordi-
narily are sophisticated investors who desire to lend large sums of
money for a very short time;25 depository institutions and securi-
ties dealers, however, mass-market retail repos to purchasers26 who
possess varying levels of financial expertise2 7 and who desire to in-
vest smaller amounts of money28 for somewhat longer periods of
time.29 Consequently, many small investors participate in the retail
repo market, often with a very limited understanding of the repo
transaction.
Although investors have entered wholesale repo transactions
for many years, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
(FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in August 1979
jointly promulgated new regulations"0 that for the first time au-
thorized banks and other depository institutions to offer their cus-
tomers retail repos. 1 These agreements did not gain significant
popularity, however, until mid-1981, when banks and savings and
loans began offering retail repos at competitive interest rates that
attracted all-savers' deposits and deterred the depletion of depos-
its which customers caused by placing their money in money mar-
ket funds.3 2 Retail repos subsequently have gained immense popu-
24. FED GUIDELINES, supra note 6, 1 35,303; see REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS-RTAIL AND
WHOLESALE (Apr. 13, 1982) (Federal Reserve Board policy letter), reprinted in 3 FED. BANK-
ING L. REP. (CCH) T 35,302.
25. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-
18122); San Francisco Fed Explores the Retail Repurchase Agreement, RAYLUX Bus. OuT-
LOOK, Nov. 29, 1982 (available Feb. 6, 1984, on Naxis, wire services file) [hereinafter cited as
RAYLux].
26. See, e.g., In re Fidelity Fin. Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 83,239, 85,240-41 (July 30, 1982).
27. See id.
28. Investors may purchase retail repurchase agreements in denominations as low as
$1000 to $2500. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No.
34-18122).
29. Retail repurchase agreements vary in length from 1 to 89 days. Most retail repos
last longer than one week but less than 90 days. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), however, has proposed to eliminate the 90-day limit on retail repos. 47 Fed. Reg.
37,248 (1982) (proposed amendment to 12 C.F.R. § 329.10(B)(s)).
30. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (1979).
31. See RAYLUX, supra note 25.
32. Id. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 authorized the De-
pository Institutions Deregulation Committee (DIDC) to create new forms of secured depos-
its that would compete with money market mutual funds for money invested by customers
of depository institutions. Judd, New Deposits, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Weekly Letter, Jan. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1. As a result, the DIDC created two new depository
1984]
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larity, and approximately 5591 institutions offered them as of July
31, 1982.88
Retail repos are attractive to many investors because they of-
fer high liquidity and because depository institutions may pay repo
investors interest rates that exceed federal interest rate ceilings on
deposits. 4 Despite these attractive characteristics of retail repos,
however, the FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) insure only transactions that federal regula-
tions characterize as deposits; 5 and since federal regulations spe-
cifically define deposits to exclude repos, s these federal agencies
do not insure repo investments. Federal regulatory authorities do
require repo issuers to back the agreements with United States
government securities of a value at least equal to the issuer's obli-
gation under the repo.ss Recent failures of several banks and other
instruments: Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDA), which have been available since
December 14, 1982, and Super-NOW accounts, which have been available since January 5,
1983. Super-NOW and MMDA accounts are available in denominations of $2500 with no
interest rate ceilings. Id. MMDA's allow up to six account transfers per month, and Super-
NOW accounts give account holders unlimited check-writing privileges. Id.
Although Super-NOW and MMDA accounts have deterred deposit depletion in deposi-
tory institutions by competing with money market funds for customer money investment,
neither account seems as attractive to small investors as repurchase agreements. First, de-
pository institutions and securities dealers sell retail repos in denominations ranging from
$1000 to $100,000, see What You Don't Know About Repos Could Hurt You, A.B.A. BANK-
ING J., Oct. 1981, at 114, while the Super-NOW and MMDA accounts have fixed minimum
denominations of $2500, Judd, supra, at 1, col. 1. Second, the yield on retail repurchase
agreements is higher than on the Super-NOW and MMDA accounts because the repurchase
agreements are not subject to reserve requirements, while Super-NOW accounts are subject
to a 12% reserve requirement and MMDA's may be subject to reserve requirements as high
as 3%. Id. at 2, col. 2. Last, retail repurchase agreements are available to both business
investors and individuals, while Super-NOW accounts are available only to individuals and
MMDA's are subject to reserve requirements for nonpersonal accounts. Id. at 2, col. 2; id. at
3, col. 2. A factor that favors Super-NOW accounts and MMDA's, however, is that the fed-
eral government insures them, while a repurchase agreement issuer's general funds and the
securities underlying the agreement are the only sources of security backing repurchase
agreements. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-
18122).
33. Holland, supra note 8, at 8. The national dollar volume of the retail repo market
was approximately $21 billion as of August 1982. RAYLUX, supra note 25.
34. 12 C.F.R. § 271.1(f)(2) (1983).
35. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 264(a) (1976 & Supp. V).
36. Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(vii)(B) (1983); Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. §
271.1(f)(2) (1983).
37. See FED. GUmELINES, supra note 6.
38. See, e.g., FHLBB, Memorandum No. R-51a (Sept. 8, 1981), 3 FED. BANKING L.
REP. (CCH) I 40,379D [hereinafter cited as FHLBB Memorandum]; OCC Issues Guidelines
for National Bank Operation of Retail Repurchase Programs, [1981] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 98,730 (May 14, 1981); FDIC Statement of Policy on Retail Repurchase Agree-
ments, 46 Fed. Reg. 49,197 (1981).
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financial institutions that issue retail repos,39 however, demon-
strate that this requirement does not protect retail repo investors
from some significant risks that accompany repo investing.
In light of the actual and potential financial harm that repo
investors faced after failures of several repo market participants,
this Note proposes a new legal characterization of repos and argues
for adoption of proposed Bankruptcy Code amendments pertaining
to repos. Both of these suggestions would give repo investors sig-
nificant future financial protection without destroying the
financially attractive characteristics of repurchase agreements.
Part II of this Note begins laying the foundation for this proposal
by discussing current repo market problems that the failures of
several repo issiers have exposed. Part II discusses new policies
concerning the appropriate uses of the collateral securities under-
lying repo transactions, the rights of repo investors against insol-
vent repo issuers, and the need for disclosure to repo investors of
financial information concerning repo issuers. Part III analyzes the
possibility and economic feasibility of characterizing repos as
loans, as separate securities, or as separate purchases and sales of
the underlying securities. Part III concludes that characterizing re-
poe as separate purchases and sales of the underlying securities
would best protect repo investors from financial loss and preserve
the attractive financial characteristics of repo transactions. Finally,
Part IV analyzes the legal consequences of characterizing repos in
this manner under the securities laws and the Bankruptcy Code.
This analysis reveals that a characterization as separate purchases
and sales of the underlying securities would exempt repos from the
costly and time-consuming securities laws registration require-
ments, yet still would protect repo investors under the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws. This classification also should
yield favorable treatment of repo investors under the Bankruptcy
Code. Congress, however, should adopt current proposed amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Code that will insure the safety and li-
quidity of the repo market irrespective of which judicial character-
ization courts apply to repos.
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE REPO MARKET
The failure of several repo issuers since 1982 raised new issues
that have tarnished the attractiveness of investing in repos. These
issues concern the appropriateness of various uses of the securities
39. See infra text accompanying notes 50-83.
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that underlie the repos, the rights of repo investors under the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code, and the neces-
sity for disclosure to repo investors of financial information con-
cerning repo agreements and their issuers.
A. Appropriate Uses of the Underlying Collateral
The May 1982 failure of Drysdale Government Securities,
Inc.' 0 focused the attention of financial markets on the permissible
uses of the securities that underlie repos. The repo transactions
that Drysdale executed utilized currently impermissible methods
to take advantage of a pricing anomaly in the repo market. This
scheme seemed to be the primary cause of Drysdale's failure.41 The
company obtained securities under repos that it transacted prima-
rily through Chase Manhattan Bank with other securities lenders
and dealers.42 At that time repo prices typically did not include
interest accrued on the securities.43 Drysdale then sold these secur-
ities in the cash market for a price that included the securities'
accrued interest.44 Drysdale then replaced the securities that origi-
nally backed the repos with different securities which had equal
face values but later maturity dates and less accrued interest.45
Drysdale intended to profit from the differential between the ac-
crued interest rate on the securities that it sold on the cash market
and the securities which it substituted in the repos.
4 '
Drysdale's scheme failed because the financing costs stemming
from the securities sales and substitutions consumed its profits
47
and eventually led to its insolvency. Chase Manhattan Bank and
other intermediaries in Drysdale's repo transactions reimbursed in-
jured repo participants for losses in excess of $140 million that re-
sulted from the Drysdale failure. 8 In response to this failure, the
New York Fed altered its policy regarding the permissible uses of
40. Undercapitalized speculation with repo-generated funds apparently caused Drys-
dale's failure. Donoghue, Investing With Care in a Post-Drysdale Market, 121 Ta. & EsT.
20, 20 (1982). One commentator has estimated total losses from the Drysdale failure to be
over $140 million. Id.
41. Id.
42. Chase Manhattan Bank and several other institutions served as conduits between






48. See Donaghue, supra note 40, at 20.
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the securities underlying repurchase agreements by requiring that
the price of repos include interest that has accrued on the underly-
ing securities.4 9 This change will insure uniform pricing of all repo
transactions and will prevent similar Drysdale-type ploys in the
future.
B. Rights Against an Insolvent Repo Participant
The recent failure of two repo market participants also fo-
cused the financial market's attention on the potential loss of li-
quidity and security that parties to repo transactions could incur
under the Bankruptcy Code if another party to the transaction be-
comes insolvent. In 1982 Lombard-Wall, Inc., a government securi-
ties dealer that sold securities under repo agreements to obtain
funds,50 became insolvent and filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code.5 1 When Lombard-Wall filed its peti-
tion, investors who had entered repurchase agreements with Lom-
bard-Wall had effective possession of the securities that backed
their repos and wanted to know whether they could liquidate the
securities. 52 If the bankruptcy court characterized their repos as
loan agreements, then the investors would have had to obtain the
court's permission to sell the underlying securities; but if the court
chose to characterize the transactions as separate purchases and
sales of the securities, then the repo holders could have sold the
securities without court approval.53
49. Id.
50. Holland, supra note 8, at 11.
51. See In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., 23 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
52. See Holland, supra note 8, at 11.
53. Id. The following excerpts from a letter to Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal
from Mr. Thomas A. Russo contain useful information concerning the consequences of repo
characterization under the Bankruptcy Code and applicable insolvency laws:
The most important legal uncertainty concerning repos ... is whether they will
ultimately be characterized, for purposes of the code or other applicable insolvency
laws, as secured loans or as independent contracts for the sale and repurchase of
securities.
In assessing the significance of this issue it is important to note that upon filing of
a bankruptcy petition under the Code a creditor is automatically stayed from setting
off obligations of the debtor to the creditor against obligations of the creditor to the
debtor and from liquidating any property which is property of the estate of the debtor.
If a repo to the debtor was treated as a secured loan from the debtor to a borrower
for which the borrower had provided securities to the debtor as collateral, the borrower
might have difficulty in obtaining the securities from the debtor or trustee (if one was
appointed) upon tender of payment if the securities had increased in value.
19841
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The bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York
in In re Lombard-Wall, Inc." effectively held that the securities
underlying repo agreements were collateral for loans despite the
actions of the New York Fed and two securities reporting
firms55-Solomon Brothers and Goldman, Sachs & Company-that
intervened in the bankruptcy proceedings to argue that repos are
purchases and sales of the underlying securities." Despite its hold-
ing, the bankruptcy court has granted several Lombard-Wall repo
holders individual permission to dispose of the securities that
backed their repos.5 7 If other courts strictly follow Lombard-Wall's
repo characterization, repo purchasers will face a serious but latent
risk of financial harm. The bankruptcy of a repo issuer will make
the unsecured repo holders only general creditors of the bankrupt
issuer, thereby forcing them to suffer loss of liquidity while await-
Although the borrower might successfully maintain a so-called reclamation pro-
ceeding to force the debtor or trustee to return the securities to the borrower on the
theory that the securities were merely collateral and not property of the estate, it is
likely that substantial delay and expense would be involved.
If a reverse repo to the debtor was treated as a secured loan from a lender to the
debtor for which securities had been delivered by the debtor to the lender as collateral,
the lender would be automatically stayed by the filing of a petition from setting off the
reverse repo against other obligations of the debtor to the lender and from liquidating
the securities held as collateral.
The second possible characterization of repo and reverse repo transactions is that
they involve, for purposes of the code, completed sales or purchases of securities, re-
spectively, and independent executory contracts to repurchase or resell the securities.
Under the Code, the debtor or trustee would have the right to decide [within 60 days]
which of these executory contracts to assume and perform and which to reject.
.. . In a reorganization proceeding, however, this decision would not be required
to be made ... until confirmation of the reorganization plan, an event which might
occur several years after the petition was filed.
The manifold uncertainties concerning the treatment of repos in a bankruptcy
context provides a strong incentive to repo market participants to avoid entering into,
or to attempt to extricate themselves from, commitments with firms who have or are
rumored to have financial difficulties.
Letter to Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal from Thomas A. Russo, reprinted in Am.
Banker, Aug. 13, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
54. 23 Bankr. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
55. Reporting government securities dealers regularly submit financial statements,
daily position reports, and daily volume reports to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Presently, 36 firms are reporting government securities dealers. These firms are market
makers in United States Treasury securities, and they typically purchase from 35% to 75%
of the total amount of new issues that the Treasury sells at each auction. See Public Securi-
ties Association, Government Securities Newsletter (May 9, 1983).
56. Holland, supra note 8, at 11.
57. Id.
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ing the bankruptcy court's permission to liquidate their underlying
securities. Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code would give the bank-
ruptcy trustee discretion concerning liquidation of the underlying
securities. 58 Thus, if the underlying securities have decreased in
value, the trustee may avoid the executory repo contract to repur-
chase the securities.59
A situation similar to Lombard-Wall occurred on August 6,
1982, when federal regulators closed the Mount Pleasant Bank &
Trust Company, a small Iowa bank with assets of approximately
$25.5 million, and left bank customers who held retail repos scram-
bling to recover their investments."0 The FDIC, acting as receiver
for Mount Pleasant, transferred the bank's deposits to the Hawk-
eye Bancorporation of Des Moines, but did not transfer Mount
Pleasant's repos and other liabilities."1 The FDIC then faced the
issue whether under Iowa's version of the UCC 2 the investors of
$353,500 in retail repos held a perfected or unperfected security
interest in the government securities underlying the agreements.6 3
If the FDIC had determined that the repo investors held a per-
fected security interest in the government securities, Iowa law
would have entitled them to treatment as secured creditors and to
reimbursement upon sale of the securities.64 In late September
1982, however, the FDIC held that the repo investors did not hold
a properly perfected security interest.65 The repo investors conse-
quently became only general creditors of Mount Pleasant without
any special claim to the underlying securities.6 Thus, the repo in-
vestors will wait months or possibly years with other general credi-
tors to receive a pro rata share of Mount Pleasant's liquidated
assets.67
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982).
59. A bankruptcy trustee would disavow the executory contract to resell the securities
underlying a repo transaction to the original seller only when the securities would bring
more money on the open market than by resale pursuant to the repo agreement. See id.
60. Am. Banker, Sept. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
61. Id. at col. 3; Am. Banker, Sept. 20, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
62. See IowA Cons ANN. § 554.4214 (West 1967) (adopting the 1972 revision of article
9 of the UCC).
63. Am. Banker, Sept. 14, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
64. Why the 'Repo' Market Bothers Regulators, Bus. WK., Sept. 6, 1982, at 36.
65. The Mount Pleasant repo investors did not hold a perfected security interest in
the securities underlying the agreement because neither the investors nor Mount Pleasant
placed the securities in a valid trust with a third party pursuant to Iowa law. Am. Banker,
Sept. 20, 1982, at 3, col. 1.




C. The Need for Disclosure of Information Concerning the
Repo Agreement and the Issuing Institution
Although United States government securities typically back
repos, these agreements essentially are general obligations of the
issuing institution. A repo issuer's financial ability to fulfill its
financial obligations, therefore, is a critical concern of repo inves-
tors. These investors also should know whether, under state com-
mercial law, they hold perfected or unperfected security interests
in the repo's underlying securities, because only a perfected secur-
ity interest will insure that the investor enjoys the status of a se-
cured creditor if the repo issuer becomes insolvent. 8 Absent full
disclosure of financial information pertinent to these concerns, in-
vestors may make uninformed decisions concerning repo invest-
ments that primarily rely upon the apparent safety and liquidity of
a repo's underlying securities, rather than upon the legal nature of
the purchaser's interest in the securities or the financial soundness
of the issuing institution. The failure of the Fidelity Savings and
Loan Association of San Francisco (Fidelity) in 1982 illustrates
this problem. 9
Fidelity commenced its retail repo program during June 1981
and issued repos to the public in denominations of $2500 to
$100,000.70 In advertising its retail repos, Fidelity implied that the
repos were virtually risk-free investments, when in fact several se-
rious undisclosed risks accompanied investment in these agree-
ments.71 For example, Fidelity repo advertisements suggested in-
vestment safety by stating that "retail repo investors had a
'security interest' in 'pledged' government securities" which a cus-
todial bank "held in trust" for the benefit of all purchasers.
These advertisements, however, did not disclose that further steps
might be necessary to perfect a security interest in the underlying
securities 7 and consequently that the investors risked classifica-
68. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
69. In re Fidelity Fin. Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,239
(1982). As of December 31, 1981, Fidelity was approximately the twentieth largest savings
and loan association in the United States. Id. at 85,240.
70. Id. at 85,241.
71. Id. at 85,242.
72. Id.
73. Id. In a published report of a private investigation that the Division of Enforce-
ment conducted concerning false and misleading statements which Fidelity made in connec-
tion with its offer and sale of repos, the SEC made the following statement about whether
Fidelity's repo investors held perfected security interests in the underlying securities:
In order for the security interest to provide safety to retail repo investors in the event
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tion as only unsecured general creditors if Fidelity became insol-
vent.7 4 Moreover, the Fidelity advertisement that a custodial bank
would hold the securities backing the repos in trust for the benefit
of investors was a misrepresentation because Fidelity never at-
tempted to execute a trust agreement under California law. 5
Fidelity also misled its repo investors by not adequately in-
forming them of its severe financial difficulties e.7  Although Fidelity
began experiencing financial difficulties in 1980, it did not inform
repo investors of these troubles until February 1982, some time af-
ter its auditor, Peat Marwick Mitchell & Company, warned in a
disclaimer of opinion to Fidelity's 1981 financial statement that Fi-
delity faced insolvency unless it reversed its trend of financial
loss."7 On February 24, 1982, in response to a letter from the San
of insolvency, the security interest must be perfected. If the security interest is un-
perfected, retail repo investors have no priority over unsecured creditors.
There is a substantial question whether the security interest of [Fidelity's] retail
repo investors were perfected because the custodian was not notified of the identity of
the retail repo purchasers or the amount of their security interests. Further factors
weighing against perfection are that the custodian was not obligated to the retail repo
purchaser under the terms of the custodial agreement and [Fidelity] retained an unfet-
tered right to withdraw the collateral at any time without any requirement of
substitution.
Id. at 85,243 (footnotes omitted).
74. Id. at 85,242.
75. Id. at 85,243. The SEC made the following statement about Fidelity's misrepresen-
tation that they had placed the securities that backed their repos in trust for their repo
investors:
[Fidelity's] retail repo agreement stated that the retail repo was "backed by the pledge
of the Securities" and that the securities were held "in trust" in a custodial account.
However, no trust for the benefit of the retail repo investor was created by [Fidelity's]
custodial arrangements. California's civil code requires that the terms of a trust, i.e.,
nature, extent and object, be expressed in a declaration of trust. No declaration of trust
was communicated to the custodian, and no written document was executed reflecting
a trust agreement or trust arrangement.
Id.
76. Fidelity incurred the following financial difficulties between 1980 and its failure in
1982:
Since 1980, [Fidelity Financial Corp. and its chief subsidiary Fidelity Savings and
Loan Association] have experienced financial difficulties. Fidelity lost $1.3 million in
earnings in 1980 and $56.9 million in the fiscal year ended December 31, 1981. The
stockholders' equity decreased from $89.3 million in 1980 to $32.8 million as of Decem-
ber 31, 1981. In the third quarter of 1981, [Fidelity Savings and Loan] fell below the
regulatory net worth levels established by the FHLBB and the State of California. The
continuation of losses into 1982 appeared certain since its yield on loans and invest-
ments was 10.54% and its cost of funds was 12.15% at 1981 year-end.
Id. at 85,241.
77. Fidelity's independent auditor, Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., in a disclaimer of
opinion to Fidelity's 1981 financial statements, concluded that:
Unless the trend of loss is reversed or there is an infusion of equity capital and
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Francisco FHLBB advising it to terminate its retail repo program
for failing to comply with FHLBB and securities law guidelines
concerning financial disclosure,7 s Fidelity began sending informa-
tion to each of its retail repo investors stating that it was operating
at a loss and was below federal and state regulatory net-worth re-
quirements.7 e Additionally, Fidelity issued a press release"0 in late
January that "gave the impression of business as usual, although
with losses."8"
According to an SEC investigatory report, neither of these dis-
closures adequately conveyed the severity and immediacy of Fidel-
ity's precarious financial situation, as exemplified by Fidelity's fail-
ure to acknowledge publicly that its independent auditors
contemplated issuing a letter disclaiming an opinion on Fidelity's
financial statements for the year ending December 31, 1981.82 For-
tunately, Fidelity satisfied all of its $67 million in repo debts
before federal regulators forced Fidelity to close and placed it in
receivership in April 1982.88 Nevertheless, the injury the Fidelity
scenario could have caused repo investors demonstrates the need
for repo issuers to disclose fully information concerning their
financial stability and the hidden risks underlying repo
investment.
unless future net cash requirements can be funded without the conversion of noncash
assets to cash at substantial losses, stockholders' equity will be fully depleted during
1982 and Fidelity Financial Corporation and its subsidiary [the Association] may be
unable to continue in existence.
Id.
78. Id. at 85,244.
79. Id.
80. Corporations have a duty, under well-established principles of law, to ascertain
that disclosures in their press releases are not misleading. Id. at 85,244 & n.6. Courts have
enforced this duty "in part, to enhance public confidence in the availability of material
corporate information and in the resulting open and honest character of trading." Id. at
85,244.
81. Id. The SEC's investigatory report concerning Fidelity's failure stated that:
On January 29, 1982, Fidelity issued a press release which reported a net loss for
the quarter ($19.7 million) and for the year ($56.9 million) ended December 31, 1982
and a decline in savings deposits in 1981 (from $1.6 billion to $1.4 billion). At the same
time it reported increased revenue (from $75.9 to $77.7 million) and assets (an increase
of 1.9% to $2.9 billion).
Id.
82. Id.
83. Quinn, A Warning About Repos, NEwswEEK, Oct. 25, 1982, at 112.
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III. LEGAL CHARACTERIZATION OF REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS
The financial problems and risks that presently accompany
repo investment persist partly because neither courts nor federal
regulatory bodies have given repos a clear legal characterization."4
In reaching a legally sound and equitable characterization of repos
under existing law, courts and federal regulators should attempt
both to preserve the attractive financial characteristics of repos
and to protect repo investors from financial injury. Part III of this
Note examines three possible legal characterizations of a repo
transaction: as a loan, as a separate security, and as a purchase and
sale of the securities underlying the agreement.
A. The Repo as a Loan
Repos potentially are classifiable as commercial loans 5 be-
cause several characteristics of both retail and wholesale repo
transactions closely resemble short-term loan agreements. First,
repo issuers, like ordinary borrowers, must pay interest to the repo
holder for the privilege of using the repo holder's money.86 Second,
as in some loan agreements, the repo issuer pledges securities to
the repo holder as collateral that supposedly assures the repo
holder of reimbursement of the money investment.8 7 Third, al-
though repo transactions technically resemble the sale and repur-
chase of an interest in certain securities, these securities serve the
same function as collateral in loan transactions.8 Last, when the
issuer repays the repo holder by repurchasing the underlying se-
curities, the holder expects to receive only the amount of money
that he originally invested plus a fixed rate of interest on his
money that the market value of the underlying securities does not
affect.89 The risk of fluctuation in the value of the underlying se-
curities remains with the repo issuer even though the holder tech-
84. See supra notes 40-83 and accompanying text.
85. This Note limits its discussion to the potential characterization of repos as collat-
eralized loans of a commercial nature. A repo characterized as a short-term commercial loan
is beyond the scope of the federal securities laws. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490,
492 (5th Cir. 1974). If a court characterizes repos as an investment-type loan, then the an-
tifraud and registration provisions of the securities laws apply. See C.N.S. Enter. v. G. & G.
Enter., 508 F.2d 1354, 1361 (7th Cir. 1975); Annot., 39 A.L.R. FED. 357, 365 (1978). Given
the short-term fully-collateralized nature of repos, a commercial loan characterization is
more appropriate.
86. See Holland, supra note 8, at 8.
87. Id.
88. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
89. See id.
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nically owns the securities during the life of the agreement.90
Despite these similarities, other characteristics of repos distin-
guish them from loans. Unlike most loans, for example, if a repo
issuer exclusively backs a repo with United States government or
agency securities, federal regulations exempt repos from federal
loan limitations,9 1 interest rate ceilings 9 2 and reserve require-
ments." Other significant legal and policy consequences of treating
repos as loans, however, provide stronger reasons for rejecting this
characterization.
First, classifying repos as loans would not allow courts or the
SEC to enforce the antifraud and disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws against repo issuers.9 4 Thus, scenarios such
as those that arose during the failures of Lombard-Wall, Mount
Pleasant Bank,96 and Fidelity Savings and Loan, 7 in which many
repo investors unnecessarily remained uninformed of the riskiness
of repo investments" or the financial conditions of repo issuers,
could recur and injure future repo investors.
Second, the value ofthe underlying securities, which repre-
sents the repo holder's security interest, increases and decreases
depending upon fluctuations in the securities' market value.99 If
90. Id. The market value of the government securities that back repos varies inversely
with the market rate of interest for similar securities. For example, if government security A
pays a fixed short-term interest rate of 10% and the market rate of interest rises to 12%,
investors will purchase security A at 10% only if they can pay a discounted purchase price
that would make security A's effective yield to maturity approximately equal to the 12%
rate of interest that other similar securities pay.
91. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1131 (1983). The Comptroller of the Currency determined that:
"[tihe purchase or sale of securities by a bank, under an agreement to resell or repur-
chase at the end of a stated period is not a borrowing subject to 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1982)
[limiting indebtedness incurred by a national bank to the amount of paid-in capital
stock plus 50% of unimpaired surplus] nor an obligation subject to the lending limit of
12 U.S.C. § 84 (1982) [limiting the liability of any person to a national bank to 15% of
paid-in capital and unimpaired surplus]."
Id. Congress subsequently repealed 12 U.S.C. § 82. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1510 (1982).
92. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.1(f)(2) (1983).
93. Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(vii)(B) (1983).
94. The securities laws will not apply to repos if courts characterize them as loans. See
Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
98. If courts characterized repos as loans and a repo issuer filed for bankruptcy, the
securities underlying the repo would become property of the bankrupt issuer's bankruptcy
estate under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Am. Banker, Sept. 10, 1982, at 18, col. 1. Thus,
repo holders would lose their ability to liquidate the securities underlying the repos to re-
cover their investment. Id.
99. Repo issuers typically bear the risk that the securities underlying a repo will fluc-
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the repo issuer files for bankruptcy,100 section 541(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code101 deems the securities property of the issuer's
bankruptcy estate and therefore subjects them to the repo holder's
lien. If the repo holder has a perfected security interest in the se-
curities,102 the repo holder becomes a secured creditor of the bank-
rupt issuer.103 If, however, the repo holder does not hold a per-
fected security interest, he becomes an unsecured creditor of the
issuer, and the bankruptcy trustee can avoid the holder's lien and
tuate in value. When a repo issuer becomes insolvent, however, the underlying securities
protect a repo holder only if the market value equals or exceeds the original repo price. See
FHLBB Memorandum, supra note 38.
100. The Bankruptcy Code does not cover bank insolvencies. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2)
(1982); see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6265, 6275 ("Banking institutions... [are] excluded from liquidation
under... [the] bankruptcy laws because... alternative provision is made for their liqui-
dation under various state or federal regulatory laws.").
101. A bankruptcy debtor's estate, subject to certain exceptions not applicable to re-
pos, consists of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the com-
mencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982).
102. To perfect an interest in United States government securities, which typically
back repos and exist in book-entry or uncertificated form, the repo parties must comply
with the following procedures:
A transfer or a pledge of book-entry [government securities] to a Reserve Bank ... or
to any transferee or pledgee eligible to maintain an appropriate book-entry account in
its name with a Reserve Bank under this subpart, is effected and perfect, notwith-
standing any provision of law to the contrary, by a Reserve Bank making an appropri-
ate entry in its records of the [securities] transferred or pledged.
31 C.F.R. 350.4(a) (1983) (emphasis added); see also 31 C.F.R. § 306.115(d) (1983) (" 'Book-
entry Treasury security' means a Treasury bond, note, certificate of indebtedness, or bill
issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, in the form of an entry made as
prescribed in this subpart on the records of a Reserve Bank.").
These federal procedures expressly preempt the perfection requirements of the UCC.
Mitchell, Repurchase Agreements, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1983, at 3. Once a federal reserve bank
makes the appropriate book entry, the repo purchaser acquires a perfected security interest
in the underlying government securities. Id. The Treasury's automatic perfection regula-
tions apply only to book-entry transfers, to federal reserve banks, and to the accounts of
Federal Reserve System member banks. Id. Nonmember banks and other financial institu-
tions must comply with separate Treasury regulations providing for the perfection of secur-
ity interests in book-entry government securities that member banks deposit for the ac-
counts of their customers. Id. When the nonmember banks and other financial
intermediaries act as custodians for their customers' accounts, these regulations require that
they accomplish perfections "by any means that would be effective under applicable law to
effect a transfer or to effect and perfect a pledge of the [government securities], or any
interest therein, if the [securities] were maintained by the Reserve Bank in bearer definitive
form." 31 C.F.R. §§ 306.118(b), 350.4(b) (1983). The phrase "applicable law" in 31 C.F.R. §§
306.118(b), 350.4(b) usually refers to the appropriate state's version of the UCC. Compliance
with state UCC procedures ensures that a repo purchaser's claim is superior to the claims of
other creditors of the repo issuer in the event of insolvency. Mitchell, supra, at 3.
103. See RAYLux, supra note 25.
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liquidate the securities in the open market.1 0 4 The issuer's bank-
ruptcy proceedings, therefore, could force repo holders to wait
months or even years before receiving complete or partial repay-
ment of their repo investments.
Last, if an insolvent repo issuer is a federally insured deposi-
tory institution and federal regulators place it into receivership," 5
the repo holder's desire to enforce the repo contract might com-
pete directly with the federal insurer's interest in protecting depos-
itors of the defunct bank.108 Thus, these three negative implica-
tions of a loan characterization demonstrate convincingly that
courts should not characterize repo transactions as loans.
B. The Repo as a Separate Security
Although the SEC has determined that wholesale repos are
not separate securities for purposes of the federal securities law,07
the literal meaning of two provisions in the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act) and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)
suggests that courts could characterize retail repos as separate se-
curities. Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act '0 and section 3(10) of the
1934 Act '0 specifically define a security "as any note,. . . evidence
of indebtedness, . . . investment contract, . . . [or] guarantee of
. ..any of the foregoing." 110 Despite the name that parties give to
a transaction, courts will characterize it as a "security" within the
meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts if the "underlying economic
substance or reality" of the transaction suggests this characteriza-
tion."' Retail repos, therefore, arguably are classifiable as securi-
ties because they resemble an investment contract or evidence of
indebtedness between repo issuers and purchasers.
A separate security characterization, however, would devastate
104. Section 544(a) gives bankruptcy trustees the rights and powers of a creditor that
obtains a judicial lien on the property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)
(1982). A judicial lien has priority over unsecured claims and unperfected security interests.
See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982).
105. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
106. The FDIC, as receiver for Mount Pleasant Bank and Trust, argued that it had
priority over unsecured repo holders in the securities underlying Mount Pleasant repos. Am.
Banker, Sept. 20, 1982, at 3, col. 1. In September 1982 the FDIC decided that Mount Pleas-
ant repo investors were only general creditors of Mount Pleasant with no special interest in
the underlying securities. N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1982, at 35, col. 1.
107. 46 Fed. Reg. 47,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-18122).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
109. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(10) (1982).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982).
111. SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., 483 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
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the repo market by subjecting repurchase agreements to the ex-
pensive and time consuming registration requirements of the 1933
and 1934 Acts.11 2 This classification would force repo issuers to file
formal registration statements with the SEC for all repo transac-
tions.113 This formal process is tedious and time consuming. For
example, after a repo issuer completed an elaborate registration
statement,11' the SEC then would review the repo transaction.115
This inspection could last for days or weeks depending upon the
volume of filings before the SEC.11 In addition, the cost of regis-
tration-including filing expenses, underwriter's commissions, and
attorneys' fees-can be enormous. 11" The SEC has estimated that
the average cost of filing an S-1 registration statement 18 exceeds
$100,000.119
Judicial characterization of repos as separate securities, and
the resulting requirement that repo issuers register them with the
SEC, would destroy the two most financially attractive characteris-
tics of repos: high liquidity and low transaction costs.120 A registra-
112. The costs of registering a transaction under the securities laws, including registra-
tion fees, underwriter's commissions, attorneys' fees, and printing costs, are substantial. The
SEC, for example, itemized the following schedule of estimated costs for a typical offering of
securities when the registering party uses an S-1 registration statement:





SEC Directorate of Economic and Policy Research, Form S-18, A Monitoring Report on Its
Use in 1979 (March 1980).
113. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 78o(a) (1982).
114. See supra note 112.
115. Under the SEC's current operating policy, an SEC branch chief or examiner ad-
vises registrants, within five calendar days after registration, whether the SEC will review
their registration statement. If the SEC does not select a registration statement for review,
the statement may become effective within 48 hours. Palm, Registration Statement Prepa-
ration and Related Matters, 433 PRAC. L. INsT. 101, 135 (1983).
116. "The average time between filing and effectiveness of registration statements se-
lected for full review is currently in excess of 25 days for repeat registrants and over 30 days
for first-time registrants." Id. at 136.
117. See supra note 112.
118. Registrants use an S-1 form when the securities laws specifically do not allow
them to use a shorter form. S-1 forms require complete disclosure of information describing
the registrant's business, properties, and management arrangements. The S-1 form also re-
quires the applicant to submit a complete financial statement to the SEC. See Palm, supra
note 115, at 113.
119. See supra note 112.
120. See 129 CONG. REc. E3183 (daily ed. June 27, 1983) (statement of Rep.
Fauntroy).
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tion requirement would replace the traditional liquidity that char-
acterizes repo transactions with substantial timing uncertainties
that commonly accompany long-term securities.121 The increased
repo transaction costs due to registration expenses also would
cause government securities dealers, who rely on repos as a major
method of acquiring short-term funds to finance floatation of new
government debt,122 to use other money market instruments to
perform this financing function. The combined effect of increased
transaction costs and lost liquidity would devastate the repo
market.
C. The Repo as a Purchase and Sale
Courts most effectively could solve the problems that cur-
rently cloud the wholesale and retail repo market 12 by characteriz-
ing repos as separate purchases and sales of the underlying securi-
ties. Section 2(3) of the 1933 Act12 and section 3(a)(14) of the 1934
Act 25 similarly define the term "sale." Section 2(3) states that a
sale includes "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or
interest in a security, for value," while section 3(a)(14) defines the
term to "include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of" se-
curities. 126 Although the 1933 Act does not define the term "buy"
or "purchase," the 1934 Act defines these terms to "include any
contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire" securities.1
2 7
Courts should construe these definitions to encompass repos be-
cause repos are closely analagous to other transactions that courts
121. See supra note 116.
122. Primary dealers in United States government securities use repos as a principal
means of financing the purchase and floatation of newly issued government securities. Other
securities dealers also use repos to obtain newly issued government securities from primary
securities dealers. If courts characterize repos as separate securities and subject repo issuers
to the securities law registration requirements, the cost of repo financing will increase signif-
icantly and will force these repo participants to search for less costly financing devices. This
increase in financing costs also could increase interest rates and the cost of government
borrowing. See 129 CONG. Rc. E3183 (daily ed. June 27, 1983) (comments of Rep.
Fauntroy).
123. Although the repo market was one of the fastest growing segments of United
States financial markets, many repo participants left the repo market in 1982 after the
financial collapse of Drysdale Government Securities, Inc. and Lombard-Wall, Inc. Wall St.
J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 41, col. 3.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1982).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1982).
126. Despite the slight differences in wording between the 1933 and 1934 Acts con-
cerning the definition of "sale," the definitions are functionally equivalent. Nat'l Bank of
Commerce v. All Am. Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1978).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1982).
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already have characterized as purchase and sale transactions 12 8 and
because the SEC already has characterized wholesale and, in cer-
tain circumstances, retail repos as separate purchases and sales of
the underlying securities.12 9
1. Pledge of Securities as Collateral for a Loan Characterized as
a "Sale" of Securities
The Supreme Court characterized a transaction that was very
similar to a repo as a sale and purchase of a security in Rubin v.
United States.130 This action strongly suggests that courts also
should treat repos in the same manner. In Rubin, Tri-State En-
ergy, Inc., a financially troubled energy exploration and production
corporation,"' fraudulently represented its stock in six compa-
nies 132 as good and marketable with a value of approximately $1.7
million.13 3 Tri-State pledged this stock as collateral for a loan from
the Bankers Trust Company. 34 A jury subsequently convicted Tri-
State of conspiracy to violate various federal antifraud statutes, 13 5
including section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 8 The Court granted certi-
orari solely to consider whether a pledge of securities as collateral
for a loan is an "offer or sale" of securities within the meaning of
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.
13 7
The Court upheld Tri-State's section 17(a) conspiracy convic-
tion by holding that the pledges of securities as collateral for the
Bankers Trust loan constituted an offer or sale of the securities
and therefore fell under the jurisdiction of the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws. 33 The Court first reasoned that although the
pledges transferred less than absolute title to the securities, they
"contemplated a self-executing procedure under a power that
could, at the option of the pledgee (the bank) in the event of a
128. See infra notes 130-47 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
130. 449 U.S. 424 (1981); accord United States v. Kendrick, 692 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1892 (1983).
131. Rubin, 449 U.S. at 425.
132. Id. at 425-26.
133. The securities that Tri-State pledged as collateral were practically worthless. Id.
Most of the securities were either restricted securities that a shell corporation issued or
rented securities that Tri-State did not own. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 427 n.4.
136. Id. at 427.
137. Id. at 428.
138. Id. at 431.
1984] 421
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default, vest absolute title and ownership."'13 9 Second, the Court
suggested that the pledges were offers or sales by noting that
Bankers Trust paid substantial consideration for "the inchoate but
valuable interest under the pledges and concomitant powers"'
140
and by emphasizing that the Act does not require full title to pass
to a transferee "for the transaction to be an 'offer' or a 'sale.' ,141
Last, the Court reasoned that the economic considerations and re-
alities present when a lender loans money and accepts a pledge of
securities as collateral are similar in important respects to the risks
that an investor incurs when purchasing securities.14 The Court
stated that both the lender and investor must rely on the value of
the securities and upon the transferor's representations about the
securities "regardless of whether the transferor passes full title or
only a conditional and defeasible interest to secure repayment of a
loan."'
43
The Court's holding and reasoning in Rubin strongly suggest
that courts also should characterize repos as sales and purchases of
the underlying securities. Unlike the pledge in Rubin, repos techni-
cally pass full title in the underlying securities to the repo
holder. 44 In return, the repo holder, like the lender in Rubin, loans
money to the repo issuer at a specified interest rate.145 Unlike the
lender in Rubin, however, repo holders typically receive a right of
substitution,146 which allows the holder to use or sell the securities
underlying the repurchase agreement and replace them with other
securities of the same issue that have the same accrued interest as
the original securities. 47 Thus, repos more closely resemble sales
and purchases than did the pledged securities and loan in Rubin.
Therefore, courts similarly should characterize repurchase agree-
ments as separate sales and purchases of the underlying securities.
139. Id. at 429.
140. Id. at 429-30.
141. Id. at 430.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
145. See Holland, supra note 8, at 8.
146. See Miller, 495 F. Supp. at 469.
147. See 129 CONG. Rac. H2523 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (statement of Sen. Glickman).
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2. SEC Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and
Sales of Securities
(a) Wholesale Repos
In October 1981 the SEC issued a policy statement in which it
characterized wholesale repos as separate purchases and sales of
the underlying securities.148 The effects of this classification are
twofold. First, the burdensome registration requirements in the
1933 and 1934 Acts do not apply to most wholesale repos because
the securities laws exempt from these requirements purchases and
sales of the United States government securities that typically
back wholesale repos. 149 Second, the SEC stated that the antifraud
provisions of the securities laws 50 still would apply to wholesale
repos, despite the available exemption from registration.151
Courts should adopt this characterization of wholesale repos
for several reasons. First, it will provide the parties that invest bil-
lions of dollars in the wholesale repo market with the antifraud
protection of the federal securities laws. Second, the antifraud laws
would impose a threat of liability on wholesale repo issuers for
fraudulent dealing and would promote investment safety in the
repo market. Last, this characterization would allow the SEC to
use its financial sophistication in the wholesale repo market to po-
lice the conduct of wholesale repo transactions. These positive con-
tributions to the wholesale repo market not only would instill a
stronger sense of responsibility on the part of repo issuers, but also
would increase the dwindling confidence of investors.152 This addi-
tional certainty would enhance the vigor of the wholesale repo
market. Consequently, the economy would enjoy the concomitant
effects of healthy investment: the Fed more easily could execute
short-term domestic monetary policy, securities dealers more easily
could acquire funds to finance the floatation of new government
debt, and institutional investors could enjoy more liquidity and se-
curity in their short-term investments.153
148. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release 34-18122).
149. Id. at 48,638 n.7.
150. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982).
151. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release 34-18122).
152. See Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 41, col. 3.




In addition to its policy statement concerning wholesale repos,
the SEC, in two no-action letters, implicitly treated repo transac-
tions as sales and purchases of securities. 15  The SEC first stated
that federal securities law registration requirements did not apply
to retail repo transactions because exempt United States securities
backed the agreement."5 The SEC, however, then warned that the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws would apply to the offer
and sale of the retail repos. 58 This treatment of retail repos by the
SEC effectively classifies them as separate purchases and sales of
the underlying securities. Courts should adopt this characterization
of retail repos because it would protect the many unsophisticated
purchasers against issuer fraud and would force retail repo issuers
to provide potential purchasers with sufficient information to alert
them to the hidden risks accompanying retail repo investment.
IV. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHARACTERIZING REPOS AS
SEPARATE PURCHASES AND SALES OF THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES
A. Securities Law Consequences
Although a judicial characterization of repos as separate
purchases and sales of the underlying securities will not require
repo issuers to register the transactions under the securities laws,
it will subject repo issuers to the antifraud provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts.157 The antifraud provisions will threaten repo issu-
ers with liability for making fraudulent statements to repo pur-
chasers and will insure that the issuer provides purchasers with
current information concerning the transactions.1 5 8
The threat of liability under the antifraud provisions should
force retail repo issuers15 9 to make full and accurate disclosures in
154. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release 34-18122).
155. Id. at 48,637-38.
156. Id. at 48,638.
157. A separate purchase and sale characterization would exempt repos backed by
United States government securities from registration requirements. See 15 U.S.C. §§
77c(a)(2), 78c(a)(12), 781(a) (1982). No similar antifraud exemption exists under either the
1933 or 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982).
158. See supra note 157. The antifraud provisions prohibit fraudulent conduct. Fraud-
ulent conduct includes the making of false or misleading representations concerning the
offer, sale, and purchase of securities. Characterization of repos as separate purchases and
sales would bring repos within the ambit of these antifraud provisions. See 46 Fed. Reg.
48,637 (1981) (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release 34-18122).
159. Wholesale repo issuers, unlike retail repo issuers, usually market repos to
financially sophisticated institutional and corporate investors or financial intermediaries
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all documents and representations that they make concerning re-
tail repo transactions, including all advertisements, promotions, of-
fering documents, financial statements for prospective investors,
and the repo agreements themselves. 160 These disclosures, at a
minimum, should include the following information: an accurate,
detailed, and up-to-date statement of the issuer's financial condi-
tion;161 a conspicuous statement on the face of the agreement that
the FDIC does not insure repos and that the United States govern-
ment does not guarantee them;162 a description of the underlying
securities and disclosure of the appropriate market value of the se-
curities;68 a warning that the market value of the underlying se-
curities could depreciate before the repo matures, thereby making
the holder an unsecured creditor of the issuer for the difference
between the repurchase price and the market value of the securi-
ties;164 and information advising the customer whether he has a
perfected security interest in the underlying securities under state
law, explaining the procedures for perfecting a security interest,
and describing the legal ramifications of not acquiring a perfected
security interest in the securities.16 5 These and other disclosures
should insure that retail repo investors, especially unsophisticated
ones, appreciate the hidden risks of retail repo investment.
B. Bankruptcy Law Implications
The investor apprehension currently dampening the repo mar-
ket stems in part from uncertainty concerning the various legal
consequences to repo agreement participants when one of them
files for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code presently does not ap-
ply expressly to repos, and only the Bankruptcy Court for the
rather than to the general public. Wholesale repos usually are shorter in duration than retail
repos, often only lasting overnight, and usually concern much larger amounts of money. See
Holland, supra note 8, at 8. These differences suggest that stringently enforcing the securi-
ties law disclosure requirements in wholesale repo contexts would be impractical. The threat
of liability that underlies the disclosure provisions, however, should deter wholesale repo
issuers from making fraudulent or misleading representations in repo transactions. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 77q(a), 78j(b) (1982).
160. See 46 Fed. Reg. 48,637-38 (reprinting SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-18122).
161. See Retail Repurchase Agreements-Examination Guidelines. (Apr. 16, 1982)
(letter from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), 3 FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 1 35,253; Retail Repurchase Agreements-Examination Guidelines, 3 FED. BANKINU







Southern District of New York-in In re Lombard-Wall,
Inc.16 6-has considered the issue. In Lombard-Wall the bank-
ruptcy court implicitly held that the automatic stay provision in
section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code applied to wholesale repo
holders and prevented them from liquidating the underlying secur-
ities to recoup their repo investments. 1 7 The Lombard- Wall court,
however, reached this decision only after implicitly characterizing
wholesale repos as collateralized loan transactions. Under a sepa-
rate purchase and sale repo characterization, Bankruptcy Code
treatment of repo parties would depend upon the type of parties
who enter the agreement and whether the transaction is wholesale
or retail. These confusing and varying treatments demonstrate
convincingly that Congress should pass the proposed amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code which expressly concern repos 65 because
the amendments would treat all parties to repo transactions
uniformly.
1. Potential Applicability of Section 555 to Wholesale Repos
Between Securities Dealers, Brokers, and Clearing Agencies
In 1982 Congress enacted section 55569 of the Bankruptcy
Code to prevent the insolvency of a single securities dealer1 70 from
adversely affecting others.17 1 Although the court in Lombard-Wall
did not discuss section 555, the provision technically seems to ap-
ply to repo transactions.7 2 Section 555 provides that the automatic
166. 23 Bankr. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
167. See id. The bankruptcy court implicitly characterized the Lombard-Wall repos as
secured loans by viewing the securities underlying the repo as collateral belonging to Lom-
bard-Wall. Id. at 166.
168. The Senate has passed a draft of the proposed amendments and the House of
Representatives currently is considering them. See 290 PRAc. L. INST. 401 (1982); see also
129 CONG. REC. H2523 (daily ed. May 2, 1983) (appended to remarks of Rep. Glickman)
(analyzing the proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
169. 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982) states in pertinent part:
The exercise of a contractual right of a stockbroker or securities clearing agency to
cause the liquidation of a securities contract ... because of a condition [of default
specified in the contract] shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by opera-
tion of any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any
proceeding under the title unless such order is authorized under the provisions of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.) or any statute ad-
ministered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
170. The definition of the term "stockbroker" in § 555 of the Bankruptcy Code in-
cludes both securities brokers and dealers as defined under the securities laws. 11 U.S.C. §
101(40) (1982).
171. See 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 585.
172. Section 555 states that a contractual right to liquidate a securities contract upon
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stay and avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code173 do not
apply to securities dealers who possess a contractual right to liqui-
date securities contracts such as repos. 174 Thus, if a court finds it
applicable, section 555 should allow securities dealers who have en-
tered wholesale repos with other securities dealers to recover their
investments by selling the underlying securities if the issuing
dealer goes into bankruptcy.
2. Bankruptcy Code Treatment of Retail Repos Issued by
Nondepository Institutions and Wholesale Repos Not Covered
Under Section 555
If courts choose not to apply section 555, then repo holders'
rights against insolvent issuers will fall within the provisions of
other applicable sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Under a sepa-
rate purchase and sale characterization, repo holders not subject to
section 555 would enjoy different rights under the Bankruptcy
Code than the court gave them in Lombard-Wall.7 5 If courts
adopted a separate purchase and sale classification, then the secur-
ities backing repos would not be property of the issuer's bank-
ruptcy estate.7 8 Executory repo contracts, however, would become
property of the estate,177 and the bankruptcy trustee would have
the discretion to assume or reject any of the executory repo con-
tracts pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. 178
bankruptcy or insolvency of a debtor "shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by
operation of any provision of this title" or by an order of any "court or administrative
agency in any proceeding under this title" unless specifically allowed under the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. § 78aaa et seq. (1982)). 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982).
Section 555 should cover repos under a separate purchase and sale characterization if the
repo contract includes a right to liquidate the underlying securities when a repo issuer files
for bankruptcy. See, e.g., Repurchase Agreement Between Dauphin Deposit Bank and Trust
Company and Lombard-Wall, Inc. 8, reprinted in 290 PRAc. L. INsT. 343, 347-49 (1982).
173. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365 (1982).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982); see supra note 172.
175. The bankruptcy court in Lombard-Wall did not address the question concerning
the applicability of § 555 to repo transactions. See In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., 23 Bankr. 165
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). This omission seems explainable in light of the court's treatment of repos
as collateralized loans and § 555's limited applicability to securities contracts. See supra
notes 54-56 & 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Lombard-Wall court's im-
plicit characterization of repos as collateralized loans. See 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982).
176. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982).
177. Section 541 states that, subject to certain exceptions not applicable to repos, all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor as of the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy
become property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1982).
178. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b),
(c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or
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Three scenarios concerning executory repo contracts under
section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code can arise: the trustee may as-
sume the contract," 9 reject the contract,180 or fail to do either.11
First, if a trustee assumes an executory repo contract, he simply
will pay the repo holder the repurchase price plus interest in ex-
change for the securities.1 82 Second, when the value of the securi-
ties decreases below the agreed upon repurchase price after the is-
suer files for bankruptcy, the trustee probably will reject the
executory repo contract. The repo holder will then receive the right
to liquidate the securities and pursue an unsecured damage claim
against the estate for the difference between the repurchase price
and the amount that liquidation of the securities produced.183 Last,
if a trustee in a Chapter 7 case neither assumes nor rejects an exec-
utory repo contract within sixty days after the issuer files for bank-
ruptcy, or within an additional period of time that the bankruptcy
reject any excecutory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
(b)(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of
assumption of such contract or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly
cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for
any actual pecuniary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract
or lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a breach of a
provision relating to-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the
closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this
title or a custodian before such commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 365(a)-(b)(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
180. Id.
181. Section 365 (d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code states:
In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume or reject an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor within 60 days after the order for
relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period,
fixes, then such contract or lease is deemed rejected.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982).
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). A bankruptcy trustee probably will assume an ex-
ecutory repo contract when the market value of the underlying securities exceeds the repur-
chase price specified in the repo contract.
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (1982). Section 502(g) treats persons injured by rejection
of an executory contract under § 365 as if their claims arose before the debtor filed for
bankruptcy. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 502.07 (L. King 15th ed. 1983).
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court may set during this sixty day period, section 365(d)(1) pro-
vides that the trustee effectively has rejected the contract.8 4 In
this situation the remedies available to repo holders again are the
right to liquidate the securities, and if liquidation yields less than
the repurchase price plus interest, to pursue an unsecured damage
claim against the estate for the difference.
3. Treatment of All Repo Transactions Under the Proposed
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
In the wake of the Lombard-Wall opinion, Congress promptly
began considering proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code'8 5 that would protect parties to most repo transactions
186
from the automatic stay and avoidance provisions of the Code.
187
The proposed amendments would exempt repos from these provi-
sions in precisely the same manner that section 555 currently ex-
empts securities contracts. 88 Fed Chairman Paul A. Volcker, in a
letter to Senator Robert Dole, expressly supported adoption of the
proposed amendments.' The SEC, however, has not expressed an
opinion concerning the proposed amendments, and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury openly opposes their adoption. 90 The Trea-
sury Department reasoned that a continuation of the uncertainty
that presently pervades the repo market is desirable because it will
force repo market participants to evaluate carefully the
creditworthiness of other repo parties.' 9' The need for a dependa-
184. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982).
185. See supra note 168 for a discussion of the proposed Bankruptcy Code amend-
ments that concern repos.
186. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1982) (stating that banks and savings and loan associa-
tions may not be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code).
187. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 365 (1982).
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 555 (1982); supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
189. Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, to Sena-
tor Robert J. Dole (Sept. 29, 1982), reprinted in 290 PRAc. L. INsT. 397 (1982).
190. Letter from Roger W. Mehle, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Trea-
sury, to Robert J. Dole (Mar. 16, 1983) (appended to Public Securitics Ass'n, Memorandum
Regarding Repo Bankruptcy Amendments (Mar. 30, 1983)).
191. See Public Securities Ass'n, Government Securities Newsletter (Apr. 5, 1983);
Public Securities Ass'n, Memorandum Regarding Repo Bankruptcy Amendments (Mar. 30,
1983) (letter from Roger W. Mehle, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury,
to Senator Robert J. Dole appended to memorandum). The Department of the Treasury
stated that repo creditors deserve no better treatment under the Bankruptcy Code than any
other secured creditors. The Treasury reasoned that "the perception of increased risk in the
[repo] market is healthy, because it forces more responsibility in [repo] transactions by
causing lenders to securities dealers to evaluate the financial condition of their borrowers."
Id. In an accompanying memorandum, the Public Securities Association refuted the Trea-
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ble, highly liquid vehicle to conduct domestic monetary policy, to
float government debt, and to provide short-term investment, how-
ever, outweighs the Treasury's argument. The certainty and uni-
formity that adoption of the proposed amendments would accord
parties to most repos argues forcefully in favor of congressional
adoption of the proposed amendments. Moreover, unless Congress
adopts the proposed amendments, the investor fear that has per-
vaded repo markets since the failures of Drysdale and Lombard-




Retail and wholesale repos are important facets in both the
public and private sectors of United States financial markets. The
Federal Reserve Board, for example, actively uses wholesale repos
to implement its monetary policy, and banks and savings and loan
institutions mass-market retail repos to the general public as rela-
tively inexpensive short-term financing devices. The recent failure
of several repo market participants and the actual and potential
financial harm these failures caused repo investors, however, re-
vealed the latent financial risks of repo investment and the confu-
sion concerning proper legal treatment of the problems that may
arise from these transactions.
This confusion over the proper legal characterization of repos
is partially responsible for the cloud of financial and legal uncer-
tainty that currently overhangs the repo market. Courts, for exam-
ple, could classify repos in three ways: as collateralized loans, as
separate securities, or as separate purchases and sales of the secur-
ities that underlie the agreements. Each of these legal characteriza-
tions would yield different practical and legal consequences. A sep-
arate security characterization, for example, would protect repo
investors by subjecting repo transactions to the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. This classification, however,
sury's position by questioning whether the Treasury understood either the purpose of the
legislation or the mechanics of the repo market transactions. Id. The Treasury's analysis, as
applied to the retail repo market, seems particularly flawed for at least two reasons: (1) the
law currently does not require institutional retail repo issuers to give prospective repo
purchasers financial information concerning their financial stability; and (2) many retail
repo purchasers do not possess sufficient knowledge of financial markets or finance princi-
ples to ascertain the financial condition of repo issuers. The proposed amendments of the
Bankruptcy Code, however, would protect these financially unsophisticated retail repo pur-
chasers from loss if a repo issuer filed for bankruptcy.
192. See Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 41, col. 3.
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would impose very costly and time consuming federal securities
law registration requirements on repos, thereby destroying their
most attractive investment characteristics: low transaction costs
and high liquidity. A commercial loan characterization, in the al-
ternative, would not subject repos to either antifraud or registra-
tion provisions of the federal securities laws. This classification,
therefore, would not give repo investors, particularly unsophistica-
ted initiates, adequate legal protection against incomplete or
fraudulent disclosure of information concerning the repo or the
repo issuer's financial condition. A loan characterization also would
subject repo investors to harsh treatment under the automatic stay
and avoidance provisions of the federal bankruptcy laws.
Courts, therefore, should adopt a separate purchase and sale
characterization of repos. This view would treat repo investors fa-
vorably under both federal securities and bankruptcy law, and also
would preserve the agreements' attractive investment characteris-
tics. As separate purchases and sales, repos would be exempt from
the costly and time-consuming securities law registration require-
ments, yet still would fall within the protective ambit of the securi-
ties law antifraud provisions. The antifraud provisions should force
repo issuers to disclose the hidden financial risks and legal ramifi-
cations of repo investing to prospective repo purchasers. When a
repo issuer files for bankruptcy, a separate purchase and sale char-
acterization also should result in favorable, although somewhat
confusing, treatment of repo holders under the Bankruptcy Code.
Congressional passage of proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code that concern repos, however, would clarify and improve fu-
ture bankruptcy law treatment of repo investors. Thus, courts, by
adopting a separate purchase and sale characterization of repos,
and Congress, by passing the proposed amendments to the Bank-
ruptcy Code that concern repos, would help lift the cloud of uncer-
tainty currently overhanging the repo market.
WILLIAM F. HAGERTY, IV
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